

# Some Thoughts About VANET Security with RINA

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# What is VANET?

- **V**ehicular **A**d hoc **N**ETwork
- VANETs are emerging new technology to integrate the capabilities of new generation of wireless networks into vehicles.
- “A communication node on-board a vehicle is able to establish a wireless communication with other surrounding communication nodes”
  - V2V, V2I, ....., V2X





# What is VANET?

## ■ Goals

- Provide efficient vehicular communications
- Enable a large set of **Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)** applications:
  - Improve traffic **Safety** on the road
  - Enhance traffic efficiency
  - Provide ubiquitous connectivity and services while on the road to mobile users





# VANET Applications

## ■ Three major classes

Non Safety

- **Cooperative Road Safety**: Reduce accidents by warning drivers ahead of time
- **Traffic Efficiency**: Reduce traffic jams and pollution by proposing dynamic routing and adapted speed and optimize flows of vehicles
- **Comfort and Infotainment**: provide the driver with information support and entertainment: Location based services, Bringing Internet into cars

# Cooperative Road **Safety** Applications

## ■ Road Hazard Warning



- Stationary vehicle – accident
- Traffic condition warning
- Collision risk warning
- Road work warning

## ■ Cooperative Awareness

- Emergency vehicle warning
- Motorcycle approaching indication

## ■ Communication Pattern / requirements

- Event driven
- Low Latency: between 50ms and 100ms
- High reliability: channel capacity/packetloss
- High penetration rate
- Detection capabilities of the local hazard
- Accurate positioning capabilities
- **Very frequent messages**
- **Multi-hop communications**
- **Determine Validity of Data**
- **Ensure Integrity of Data**




Source ETSI/ITS

TELECOM  
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# CAM: Cooperative Awareness Message


- **Real time ITS station data**
  - Vehicle type
  - Position, Movement
  - Sensor data..
- **Periodic: high frequency**
- **Application independent**
- **Broadcast**
- **Single Hop**
- **Objective:**
  - Maintain awareness to support cooperative performance of vehicles





# DENM: Decentralized Environmental Notification Message

- **Event-driven:** traffic event, jam...
- Application dependant
- **Multi-hop Geo-Broadcast**
- **Event-related information**
  - Event type
  - Event position
  - Event detection time/duration..
- **Objective:**
  - Depending on the application, detect an event, manage its evolution and its termination





# Security issues

- Security will be a crucial aspect of VANETs
- A security threat in VANET can mean not simply loss of information or transfer of funds but loss of life









# Attacks examples

- **Bugus Traffic Information**



Attacker: insider, rational, active


- **Disruption of Network Operations**



Attacker: insider, malicious, active



# Tracking issue






# Security Requirements

- **Authentication:**
  - React only to legitimate events
  - The receiver is ensured that the sender generated a message
- **Verification of data consistency**
  - Legitimate senders can send false data (attack/unintentional)
  - Can cause immense damage even fatalities
- **Availability**
  - Network should be available under jamming attacks
- **Non-repudiation**
  - Drivers causing accidents should be reliably identified
  - The sender of a message cannot deny having sent a message
- **Real-time constraints**
  - High speed means constraints on time
- **Privacy (conflicts with authentication)**
  - **Privacy of drivers against unauthorized observers**
  - **Any observers should not know any future actions of other nodes**



# ETSI: ITS Security functional model





# ETSI: ITS Security functional model

## ■ Enrolment

- Use of long-term certificates for identification and accountability (Enrolment Certificates)

## ■ Authorization

- Use of short-lived, anonymized certificates for V2V/V2I (Authorization Tickets/Pseudonyms certificates)

## ■ Privacy problem

- Cryptographic certificates allow tracking of vehicles

## ■ Solution


- Users privacy is protected by a pseudonym scheme
  - Changing frequently the pseudonym certificates
  - Tracking is made more difficult



# ETSI: ITS trust model (PKI)

**Enrolment Authority (EA):**  
**Validates that an ITS-S can be trusted.**

It issues an enrolment identifier for the ITS-S and a proof of its identity (Enrolment certificate).  
the EA provides an ITS-S with an enrolment ID and related enrolment certificate (long term).



**Authorization Authority (AA):** An ITS-S may apply for specific services and permissions. These privileges are denoted by means of authorization tickets (AT).  
The AA provides the ITS-S with multiple pseudonyms and the related authorization tickets (short term), to be used in V2X communication.



## Some thoughts about VANET Security with RINA

- **CAM and DENM messages (carrying geographical information) are exchanged in broadcast manner**
  
- **Privacy /tracking issues**
  
- **RINA**
  - is secure by design
  - Enrolment phase by design
  - Management system already integrated by design
  - But, how to deal with privacy in case of VANET ?



## Some thoughts about VANET Security with RINA

- **Communication architecture will be organized by area, sub region, region, Global**
- **Similar to ETSI, we propose to assign several pseudonyms to each vehicle to insure privacy within a DIF/DAF**
- **The management DIF will be in charge of such task during the enrolment phase**





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